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Abstract
This bachelor thesis deals with the de-
sign of process procedure for embedded
platform firmware management (secure
upgrade). The theoretical part consists
of characteristics of vulnerabilities in em-
bedded systems and design of commonly
used secure upgrade procedure. Further,
the required components for the design of
secure upgrade are described. The prac-
tical part specifies an advanced approach
for secure upgrade with firmware Open-
Wrt. The proposed procedure is described
and tested on embedded platform Vocore2
to provide the secure and authenticated
transfer of firmware to the device. Testing
is measured to evaluate how the procedure
is computationally demanding.
Keywords: firmware, upgrade,
embedded platform, OpenWrt, Vocore2,
AES
Supervisor: Ing. Bc. Marek Neruda,
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Abstrakt
Tato bakalářská práce se zabývá návrhem
procesního postupu bezpečného upgrade
firmware pro embedded platformu. Te-
oretická část obsahuje popis soudobých
bezpečnostních hrozeb pro embedded sys-
témy a popisuje současné postupy up-
grade firmware pro tyto zařízení. Dále
jsou zde také představeny podklady pro
návrh bezpečného upgrade firmware. V
praktické části je popsán pokročilý po-
stup, který využívá firmware OpenWrt a
embedded platformu Vocore2. Procesní
postup je vysvětlen a otestován na plat-
formě Vocore2 s cílem bezpečného přenosu
a autentizace firmware do zařízení. Pro
zjištění výpočetní náročnosti tohoto pro-
cesu je testování změřeno a vyhodnoceno.
Klíčová slova: firmware, upgrade,
embedded platform, OpenWrt, Vocore2,
AES
Překlad názvu: Bezpečný upgrade
firmware embedded platformy
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) is a popular theme which is regarded as the future remarkable
technology. It is considered a network consisting of physical devices especially embedded
platforms. These devices can communicate and send data among themselves in order
to monitor or control some activities. The term IoT is also defined as a collection of
embedded systems with sensors that are connected to the Internet [1]. IoT market rapidly
grows due to developments in hardware, increased availability, reduced cost and high
demand.
The fourth industrial revolution known as Industrial 4.0 includes IoT as well. Together
with Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), factories will expand in a more complex environment
with the ability to be more efficient. However, relatively purely protected devices are
effortless victims of hackers. Security level of devices is obviously underestimated in many
cases and an increasing number of successfully performed cyber attacks is the reason to
consider. In 2015, Hewlett Packard conducted a research and 100 % of home IoT devices
were marked as significantly vulnerable [2]. The vulnerabilities formed weak passwords,
lack of encryption while communicating through network and an account enumeration.
In the theoretical part of this thesis, vulnerabilities of embedded systems are mentioned.
As a result of purely applied security on embedded devices, various cyber attacks against
the embedded systems are committed. These attacks are described to understand an
alarming condition of most embedded systems. To protect the systems involved in the
IoT, an unsolicited modification of devices cannot be allowed. Hence, the secure upgrade
firmware has to be accomplished. In the practical part of this thesis, a process of a secure
firmware upgrade using an encryption and a monitoring of network traffic is introduced.
The whole process is described in detail and measured to provide a level of consumption
of computing resources.
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Chapter 2
Embedded Systems
Embedded systems create an essential part of the world of IoT. The devices are small-
sized computers with dedicated functions. They are widely used to collect data, monitor
environment and communicate with each other. The systems are hardware optimized for
predefined utilization and they are regarded as low power computer devices. The low
power consumption and high availability are the leading advantages.
The first made estimation of the whole number of IoT was made by Ericsson and the
company predicts 50 billion devices in 2020 [3]. However in 2017, more precise estimation
of the Gartner company was made. They examines to be 8.4 billion devices in 2017.
The number excludes smartphones, tablets, and computers. The Gartner company also
predicts 20.4 billion devices in 2020. In 2017, the consumer segment forms 63 %. The
application mostly used by consumers are smart TVs and many automotive systems.
The rest of 37 % consists of enterprise devices especially used for monitoring and data
collecting like security cameras or smart electric meters.
Most companies are involved in a development of the embedded systems which are
considered as the major products in the growing IoT market [4]. Nevertheless, embedded
systems are currently not as embedded as they used to be. Higher computer performance,
components shrinking and lower price influenced nowadays form of these devices. Em-
bedded systems still tend to be dedicated. However, many functions are added. A cell
phone is one of the finest examples of evolution in the embedded systems. The main idea
of this invention was using voice calls and text messages as a form of communication.
Through time, the cell phone converged into a smartphone – device covering an extended
number of provided services as a music player, digital camera or datalogger.
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2.1 Firmware of Embedded Systems
A firmware is a crucial software running on devices. It is located between hardware
and an application layer. The main purpose of firmware is to connect hardware resources
with the running processes. Generally, the firmware could be divided into an embedded
firmware and an operating system-based firmware.
2.1.1 Embedded Firmware
Embedded systems are hardware limited devices using custom-build firmware. The
firmware tends to be cost-effective and closely written to interact with hardware which
could be a difficult task for developers. Developers need to have deep knowledge of
hardware. Moreover, they also assemble software that cooperates with a user interface.
Directly written embedded firmware targets devices with the minimum maintenance and
the firmware is rarely upgraded.
2.1.2 Operating System-Based Firmware
As the embedded systems become more complex, demand for more complicated software
managing more capabilities has grown. Very similar process as in personal computer
evolution could be seen in the embedded devices. Computing power of devices grows
and an urgency in using more complicated software is required. An operating system
can deliver to user more than just the embedded firmware. The most popular choice for
manufacturers is a stripped down version of the Unix-like operating system – BusyBox
[5]. It uses the most useful capabilities found in the Unix system in a single executable
file. In summary, more than 300 commands could be found in the BusyBox [6]. On the
other hand, more complex firmware with more functionalities increases the possibility of
vulnerabilities released in the firmware. Maintenance of these devices is necessary and a
firmware upgrade should be released frequently. The following diagram shows a survey
conducted by VDC Research company in 2017 [7]. It covers representation of operating
systems across the embedded and IoT market.
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Figure 2.1: Previous, Current, and Expected Primary OS, by OS Source [7]
2.2 Architecture of Embedded Systems
A scalability is necessary while designing embedded systems. The design of platform is
divided into three sections – a hardware layer, a system software layer and an application
software layer. The hardware layer consists of whole components assembled on a printed
circuit board (PCB). The system software layer covers device drivers communicating with
the hardware of an embedded device. The application layer is an upper layer commonly
known as an userspace. The most running applications are executed on the application
layer which interacts with the user. To design the embedded platform some high-level
capabilities should be characterized.
. Data acquisition and control
. Data processing and storage
. Connectivity
. Power management
11
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Data acquisition refers to measuring real-world conditions and converting them into
a readable digital or analog output. Sensors are the input components involved in
measuring physical variables. Physical variables are converted to electrical signals. The
sensors can measure a lot of physical variables including temperature, pressure, humidity,
smoke, speed, proximity and others. One of the most important characteristics of sensors
is the resolution which helps to measure the variable. The output is represented by an
appropriate technology which human can interact with, e.g. LEDs, screens, speaker.
The embedded systems involved in IoT require data processing and storage capabilities
to analyze or store collected data. The processes could be executed directly on a device.
It is also possible to send data to other devices, services or applications like cloud services.
This is so called centralized analysis. An analysis of data is provided by another device or
service. On the other hand, an edge analysis is done on the embedded device collecting
data. It could discard unused data and reduce processing and output in the form of
upstream. For this purpose, more processing capabilities and larger storage is needed.
A network connectivity is necessary for an interaction of devices with each other.
An operating range and a volume of transmitted data have to be considered. The
devices can communicate wirelessly using 802.11 set of specifications, RFID (Radio-
Frequency Identification) or LPWAN (Low-Power Wide-Area Network) like LoRa and
SigFox technologies. When designing the device it must be considered that a power
consumption differs with regard to used technology.
A portable embedded systems rely on batteries or on power sources like solar. The
devices tend to be economical. However, depending on power requirements like used
sensors, computing power, data storage or network capabilities, suitable power source
has to be added. For example, Raspberry Pi 3 has the power consumption around
700 – 1000 mA of current. With every sensor added, consumption is increased, e.g. using
a camera module requires extra 250 mA [8].
Figure 2.2: Embedded System Model [9]
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2.2.1 System on a Chip
A system on a Chip (SoC) integrates a microcontroller or a microprocessor with a
graphical processor unit (GPU) or a Wi-Fi module. A Reduced Instruction Set Computing
(RISC) is widely spread microprocessor architecture in the embedded devices. An
Instruction Set is reduced and consists of fewer transistors. Moreover, power consumption
is lower than using Complex Instruction Computing (CICS) architecture. CISC is mostly
used in personal computers (PCs) and x86 architecture. The leading position on the
market of the microprocessor RISC belongs to MIPS (Microprocessor without Interlocked
Pipeline Stages) and ARM (Advanced RISC Machine) architecture. A diversity of
microprocessor could be found in the widely known commercial embedded systems as
Raspberry Pi 3 using ARM architecture. On the other hand, a computer with higher
computing performance such as Up Board is based on x86 architecture and small-sized
router Vocore2 used MIPS architecture. Every embedded platform has almost unique
hardware design. Firmware for each device is designed to cooperate only with the desired
platform. As a result of complex development for each type of device, firmware errors
could occur. It happens more frequently comparing to the microprocessor from Intel and
AMD used in PCs. The following diagram shows representation of architectures used in
the embedded systems with the total available market (TAM) in 2013 [10].
Figure 2.3: The embedded systems market with $11.3B of total available market in 2013 [10]
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2.2.2 Memory Management
The most used memory in embedded devices is a flash memory. It is a non-volatile
memory organized in blocks. The blocks are filled with data separately and independence
of block is provided. If data have to be removed, only blocks containing data will be
cleared. The rest of data remain invulnerable. This is an advantage comparing to the
older technology ROM (Read Only Memory) which needs to be fully removed to store
new data. The flash memory uses two technologies NOR (not or - electronic logic gate)
and NAND (not and - electronic logic gate). The memory storage of NOR is usually 4 –
16 Mbit. The newest NAND obtains 32 – 256 Mbit [11]. Two methods of connecting
flash memory to SoC are devised.
. Raw flash (host managed). Flash translation level (self-managed)
A memory directly connected to SoC is known as host managed. If memory is connected
via a controller to SoC, self-managed is used instead. The embedded systems solely use
host-managed. An example of self-managed is connection of SSD (Solid-State Drives) to
PC.
14
Chapter 3
Vocore2
For the testing purposes in the practical part of this thesis, the testing device needs
to be chosen. The main criteria are the computing performance which represents
general embedded platform and an ability to run the embedded firmware OpenWrt. The
embedded platform Vocore2 was chosen as the best candidate. It is a small-sized device
with an advanced computing performance and it runs embedded firmware OpenWrt.
Other candidates were Up Board and Raspberry Pi. However, these candidates were
not satisfactory. The Up Board gives powerful computing performance which is much
higher than a typical embedded platform and the device can be almost compared with
the computing performance of PCs. Moreover, the Up Board does not support OpenWrt
and a firmware management is already ensured by the default operating system Ubuntu
or Windows. The Raspberry Pi is considered a device for testing purposes and it can run
OpenWrt. Nevertheless, the system uses the SD card as the primary memory storage. To
upgrade the device, SD card has to be formatted and physically accessible. This means
that the remote upgrade is not possible and only the Vocore2 is the suitable candidate.
The Vocore is a small-sized Linux computer developed by Qin Wei, Tong Wu and
Thomas Hommers in China in October 2014. It is a low-cost computer running OpenWrt.
There are some modifications of Vocore such as Vocore, Vocore2, Vocore2 Lite or Vocore2
Ultimate. The Vocore2 Ultimate is the most expensive modification costs $44.99 and
this modification is used for an experimentation. It provides additional modules covering
USB, Ethernet and more computing performance comparing older versions. The complete
specification can be seen below.
15
3. Vocore2 ..........................................
Table 3.1: Vocore2 Ultimate specification [12]
16
Chapter 4
IoT Security Threats
The concept of IoT is based on connected embedded systems through WAN (Wide Area
Network) or LPWAN [13]. A network is considered as an untrusted area and security
requirements need to be accomplished. Known vulnerabilities such as open TCP/UDP
ports, open serial ports or use of poor password should be protected. Therefore, the
IoT devices are hardware limited and strength of security could be insufficient. An
increasing demand for IoT causes releases of vulnerable devices. Companies tend to
supply customers as quickly as possible due to high demand and revenue. However, this
is the reason for deploying undeveloped products containing critical errors. Pre-testing is
underestimated, and critical errors could be accessible for cyber attack causing steal of
data or loss of control.
High probability of already released and corrupted firmwares is a complication for
manufacturers and a reaction has to be made. It is also worth saying, that manufacturers’
revenues come from the sale of devices, not from the maintenance. Hence, if problems
are not alarming, updates are not in the main company’s attention. Nevertheless, a
frequent upgrade to a new improved firmware is the finest solution. Redistributing new
firmware into an enormous amount of devices is not possible. Instead of physical access
to a device, remote access for a frequent upgrade is necessary. Transfer of data over
untrusted area like WAN or LPWAN is secure exposure. A traffic needs to be protected
with an adequate mechanism in the mean of providing services for the vast number of
devices. The following examples are the most frequent problem of using IoT devices.. weak passwords. lack of encryption. backdoors. Internet exposure
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Weak passwords are in the most cases connected with using default credentials. It is
very important not to use default passwords. An encryption is also a significant part
of embedded systems, because not every manufacturer releases firmware supporting
cryptography. The reason for developing backdoors in the released devices is that devices
can be easily supported by the manufacturer. A default user or an open port on the
device is the most often case. Checking open ports on a device is the base rule to secure a
device from easily accessible ports like Telnet. A scanner of potentially vulnerable devices
could also be found as online tools like Shodan or IoT scanner Bull Guard. Finally, device
exposed to the Internet which accepts incoming traffic could very likely be a target of
an attacker. If previous points will not be underestimated, the device could be strongly
resistant against attacks. However, the embedded devices covering the world of IoT and
collected data from an environment should not be directly exposed to the Internet.
4.1 Security Incidents
Not surprisingly, embedded systems became an alluring playground for spreading
malicious software. The extensive number of devices is dispersed around the world
and attracts attackers to use them for their main goal – assembling botnets to perform
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on a predefined target. In the early stage,
Botnets flooded their target via UDP, TCP or HTTP protocols. According to researchers
at IBM’s X-force, new attempts of Botnets namely ELF/Mirai were aimed to use victims
for mining cryptocurrency [14]. It turned out to be effective only with cooperation
with every node acting as one miner consortium. Another example is an attack aiming
bootloaders of embedded system like UbootKit, which aims to modify bootloader. If the
attempt is successful, the device can load a malicious firmware or can be filled with junk
data to cause denial of service like IoT Brickerbot [15]. Complex analysis of IoT botnets
is useful tool to avoid vulnerabilities in a security design.
4.2 Botnet Landscape
The supremacy of botnets belongs to botnet Mirai. His presence was recorded in 2016
for the first time. Mirai is classified as Executable and Linkable Format multi-platform
worm also known as ELF Linux/Mirai. According to estimations, more than 1.5 million
IoT devices were involved in Mirai botnet after the publication of his source code. Mirai
takes part in the most catastrophic DDoS attack targeted on computer security journalist
Brian Krebs’s website with the peak of 620 Gbps. Most of the IP addresses were put
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together worldwide and most of the bots were DVRs (Digital Video Recorder), WebIP
cameras on BusyBox or purely secured Linux servers. Afterwards, when the source code
was published, more derivation of Mirai occurred such as BrickerBot or LuaBot [16] .
Figure 4.1: Historical DDoS Attacks Targeting Krebs on Security [17]
4.2.1 Infiltration and Infection
The process of spreading malware software begins by scanning random public IP
addresses followed by executing port scanning. It is usually the most vulnerable Telnet
port 23 (97 % of attempts). Some Mirai variants also targeted to TCP ports 20, 21, 2323
or 7547 which is well-known as ISP’s remote management tool for customers broadband
routers. Another Mirai descendant Radware aims at purely protected SSH port 22.
Basically, malicious malware discovers services running on a device. Afterwards, it
performs brute-force-attack by guessing passwords based on the hard-coded list to gain
remote access to the device. In case of guessing correct credentials and gaining shell
access, report message with credentials is sent to the report server. Having access to
the device, malware starts a network lookup and decides whether spreading to other
devices is possible or not. The malware attempts to execute commands wget or TFTP
which are able to download binary data. Afterwards, it checks for writable parts of
memory executing cat /proc/mounts and hardware platform information cat proc/cpuinfo.
Next, the binary data are executed and removed immediately. The procedure initializes
a new bot (device under the control of attacker) which is able to resolve IP address
of Control and Command server (CC). An infected device is then controlled by CC
and can receive command including attack types, attack duration or list of targets. It
ought to be mentioned that the malware examines system processes (PIDs) and kills
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all processes using remote access. The reason for process killing is an elimination of
other competitive malicious software related to Mirai. The newly initialized bot has the
ability to form application and network layer flood attack such as SYN (Synchronization),
ACK (Acknowledgement), UDP (User Datagram Protocol) or HTTP (Hypertext Transfer
Protocol) floods.
4.2.2 Detection of Malware
An early stage of infection could be recognized by monitoring ports 23, 2323 and
22. These ports are assaulted with recursive authorization attempts. Another pattern
could be identified with enormous TCP packets streams on an egress port of a device.
According to experiments with Mirai – infected Raspberry Pi 3, SYN flooding produces
1 500 000 SYN packets in a minute. Fortunately, packet fields are mostly not randomized
and monitored data are significant [18].
Table 4.1: Top Mirai Device Types - infected devices labeled by active scanning [17]
4.2.3 Prevention
The vulnerability of the systems is mainly caused by vendors. The shipped devices
usually run remote administrator capabilities such as Telnet or SSH. Documentation is
underestimated and customers are not accurately instructed to change default passwords
or disable a remote access. Frequent firmware upgrade to apply patches is necessary and
vendors should aware customers.
Table 4.2: Top Mirai Device Vendors - infected devices labeled by active scanning [17]
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4.3 Intel Management Engine
Intel Management Engine (Intel ME) is an accurate example of potential security
vulnerabilities of features running below the kernel of the devices’ main operating
system [19]. Intel ME can be only found in embedded system with a higher computing
performance.
Intel Corporation is the world’s second-largest semiconductor chip maker and inventor
of x86 architecture. It has the largest share in the microprocessor market of personal
computers. Not surprisingly, Intel is interested in the growing market of IoT with
their processors like Intel Quark, Intel Atom or 7th generation of Intel Core. However,
most of these chips have their own operating system based on MINIX 3, the Unix-like
distribution adjusted in need of Intel. The purpose is to monitor a device and send data
to a manufacturer. The main concern is that the whole activity is not visible to the
user of the main operating system. The possibility of a remote attack is likely raised
to a higher level. The first publicly released document about a critical vulnerability
in a remote management tool Intel Active Management Technology (AMT) inserted in
Intel ME appeared in May 2017. Some researchers from Positive Technologies discovered
more vulnerabilities and published them in November 2017. As a reaction, Intel released
information about additional bugs in Intel ME and confirmed affecting millions of
endpoints and servers worldwide [20]. As a result, many hardware vendors like Dell or
Purism disabled Intel ME from their systems. However, distribution of firmware upgrade
to every vulnerable device will be a long-term event. Meanwhile, there will be numerous
potential targets for attackers.
4.4 UbootKit: A Worm Attack for the Bootloader of IoT
Devices
U-boot is a widely used open source bootloader implemented in most embedded systems.
In 2017 Tencent Anti-Virus Laboratory demonstrated a new worm targeting bootloaders
in IoT devices, to indicate propagation between variable infected devices using ARM
and MIPS architecture. The worm tries to rewrite bootloader. Then the malicious code
which existed in the bootloader is executed after rebooting. At the end of the process,
worm downloads the whole part of itself and it will continue spreading to other devices by
scanning and remote code execution exploits. Moreover, it is very complicated to remove
the malicious worm, because it persists in bootloader and the worm is executed before
the start of Linux kernel or any userspace code. Due to this fact, the worm receives the
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highest privileges and removing him becomes complicated [21].
4.4.1 Analysis
In most of the IoT devices, flash memory can be updated with root privilege. The
reason is that firmware contains Linux kernel and file system needs privilege to be
updated. The bootloader is situated at the beginning of the flash memory following
firmware. Hence, it is possible to rewrite bootloader by the mtd_write tool. By modifying
bootloader, a piece of a malicious code can be injected. The best opportunity for running
the worm is before the Linux kernel takes control. The piece of instructions in Linux
Kernel is modified and added to the location of init. Init is the first process while booting
and its probable location is /etc/init.d. If an auto-run shell script including the malicious
code runs, it downloads the additional malicious binary file to launch and scan the
network for vulnerable devices.
4.4.2 Bypass Security Methods
The first solution coming to mind could be resetting the device. However, formatting
configuration in a file system will not affect malicious code implemented in the bootloader
area. Verification of kernel image is also not sufficient. Uboot typically supports
CRC checksum and in some cases, advanced bootloaders support even RSA signature
verification of an image. On the other hand, when UbootKit attacks the bootloader,
kernel image is not affected. It means that UbootKit can patch verification function
to return True value constantly. Moreover, the kernel image will not be modified in
the memory before booting. An injected script will be executed after the verification
procedure. As the last possible protection can be considered a protection of the flash
memory. Nevertheless, this protection is rather a method preventing unintentional writing
instead of protection against attacks. Writing to flash memory is not difficult to unlock.
4.4.3 Prevention
In order to prevent UbootKit, it necessary to ensure that bootloader was not modified.
The security method can be implemented on a chip before the infected bootloader is
executed. To verify bootloader integrity, when the first boot is made, a hash value of
bootloader is calculated and stored in flash memory. SHA256 hash algorithm can be
used. When the device is then rebooted the hash value will be calculated on bootloader
and it will be compared with the value obtained during the first boot. If a content of
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bootloader is altered, respond to IoT device should be made. The best solution is to
abort process to avoid propagation of the worm attack.
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Chapter 5
Recommendation for Securing of Embedded
Systems
The firmware upgrade is the most critical [22] and weak phase for embedded sys-
tems. There will be millions of small embedded systems diffused across the world [23].
Researchers have observed that an advancement of IoT and a deploying of vulnerable
devices will increase exponentially. In most cases, it is impossible to be physically touched.
Devices need to be upgraded remotely which gives a playground for an unsolicited action
[24]. Upgrades should be released frequently and the possibility to upgrade the device
has to be accomplished. Otherwise, the device could be exposed to malicious code or in
the worst cases to firmware modification attack. The firmware modification attack to
HP Laser Jet was conducted by students from the Columbia University to scan network
traffic. An infected printer scans a network and tries to expand further to another
vulnerable device. It is also important to mention that signed firmware is not secure
firmware. There is always the possibility to securely sign an image to verify if a firmware
integrity and authenticity was not changed. However, a certainty that firmware was
released without any critical security vulnerability is not possible to ensure [25].
. Crypto processors. Signed bootloaders. Crypto bootloaders. Network traffic detection
One possibility of securing upgrade of firmware is to use Crypto processor or verified
bootloaders. Crypto processors can help with the provision of the key. It is necessary
to assure that the device is in the correct state and cannot be threatened. The main
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reason for using the Crypto processors is the use of a securely stored key instead of
user-predefined passwords.
Initialization of ROM is the first process in the chain of booting and then ROM
executes the bootloader. Using ROM, which is able to verify the signature of bootloader,
provides assurance that bootloader was not customized by an attacker. To avoid attacks
like UbootKit described in the chapter IoT Security Threats, signed bootloader is a
solution.
Crypto bootloaders implemented in the microcontrollers are also an effective solution.
To increase the security level, it verifies the signature of an image and decides whether
the image is modified or not. Texas Instruments developed Crypto bootloaders for
MSP microcontroller [26]. The implementation is very light occupying only 3.2 KB
of code and less than 1 KB of data. Another example is Atmel which is not using
bootloaders. However, they use Ethernet AES - GCM (Advanced Encryption Standard
in Galois/Counter Mode) encryption to secure booting process of the firmware. [27].
The designs presented above are highly connected with the lowest software level of
embedded systems. On the other hand, embedded systems are becoming more complex
with more data capabilities and greater data processing. As a result, the operating
system-based firmware can be run on devices. Introducing the IoT threats, most attacks
try to scan devices and tend to find vulnerable ports, before the whole process of attack
begins. Detection of an unauthorized access and a control of a system is the fundamental
issue. Network traffic can be recorded through Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Systems (IDS/IPS). Scientific community also studied data mining methods to establish
behaviour patterns of constructed attacks [28]. It can help with the detection of an
advanced packet flooding attacks which are constructed with an unpredictable algorithm
to successfully flood the target device.
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Application of Cryptography
Communication through the network in presence of other parties has to be encrypted
to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of data also known as the CIA triad.
Applying the cryptography to transferred information is essential for every secure com-
munication. Its history is dated around 2000 BC. As the first documented reference
is considered secretly encrypted writing also known as Caesar cipher. This chapter
introduces main principles of the cryptography used in the practical part. It covers
encryption, authentication of data and key generating.
The cryptography is divided into Symmetric and Asymmetric. The symmetric cryptog-
raphy is based on sharing the same key for two parties of communication. On the other
hand, the asymmetric algorithms use private and shared public key for a process of de-
cryption/encryption. For the purposes of the practical part, the symmetric cryptography
will be described in more detail.
6.1 Symmetric Cryptography
The symmetric cryptography is divided into stream ciphers and block ciphers. The
stream ciphers encrypt every bit individually, whereas block ciphers encrypt information
to block in an identical length of bits. The result of a block cipher is that every bit of
encrypted information is determined on the key and every bit contained in an entry block.
In an early stage of the cryptography, the stream ciphers were considered as an agile
solution for an easy implementation and speed of encryption or decryption. However,
the advantage of the stream ciphers is nowadays omitted due to a computing power [29].
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Definition 6.1. Let xi be a bit of message, X be a block of message, K be a key and yi
be a bit of ciphertext.. Stream cipher: yi = E(xi,K). Block cipher: yi = Ei(X,K)
6.1.1 Stream Cipher
The classic digital stream cipher is Vernam cipher, developed in the 20th century for
encrypting telecommunication traffic. Encryption of every individual bit is achieved
by adding a bit from a keystream to a plaintext bit. The encryption and decryption
functions are the same procedure. Security of the stream ciphers completely depend on
the keystream – values si. If an attacker solves one plaintext from the ciphertext, it is
possible to deduce the keystream and decrypt communication.
Definition 6.2. Let xi be a bit of message, si be a bit of a key stream, yi be a bit of
ciphertext, where xi, yi, si ∈ {0, 1}. Encryption: yi = (xi ⊕ si). Decryption: xi = (yi ⊕ si)
Generating the keystream is the general issue for the security. Otherwise, an attacker
could predict the stream and decrypt a message. The keystream is generated by a
pseudorandom number generator discussed later and the given key serves as a seed.
6.1.2 Block Cipher
An algorithm for the block cipher takes data blocks of particular size of n bits and
encrypts these blocks with a key of a particular size. The result is the ciphertext of a
particular size. Most notably implementation is the DES cipher in early 1970s at IBM
and the AES cipher which will be discussed in detail.
6.2 Advanced Encryption Standart (AES)
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the most widely used symmetric standard.
It was invented by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen as a Rijndael cipher in 1998 for the
U.S National Institute of Standards and Technology. It was recognized as a replacement
for the Data Encryption Standart (DES). The AES block cipher is formed by block and
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key size between 128, 192 and 256 bits. However, for demonstration, 128 bit key will be
used. Based on the key size, a number of internal rounds of cipher is distinguished [30].
Figure 6.1: AES key length [31]
Each round comprise of four sub-processes:. Byte Substitution (SubBytes). Shift Rows.Mix Collumns. Add Round Key
The process for encryption and decryption is inverse. At the beginning, Byte Substitu-
tion is conducted. It takes 128 bites from a message and a sequence of bits is transferred
into 16 bytes matrix (4x4). The 16 input bytes in matrix are substituted by looking up
a fixed table (S-Box). As example, the input byte to the S-Box is Ai = 53(16) then the
output byte will be ED(16)
Figure 6.2: AES S-Box: Substitution values in hexademical notation for input byte (xy) [31]
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Shift Rows is the next step. Created matrix is used as input. Following shift is made:
. First row is not shifted.
. Second row is shifted one byte position to the left.
. Third row is shifted two byte positions to the left.
. Fourth row is shifted three byte positions to the left.
Figure 6.3: the input of Shift Rows [31]
Figure 6.4: the output of Shift Rows [31]
The major of the Mix Columns is diffusion. Each column of four bytes is transformed
using a fixed matrix. The result is that every byte in a column of an output matrix
depends on a value of four bytes in columns of input matrix.
At the end, Add Round Key has to be performed. The main sub-process is the Key
schedule. It takes the original input key of length 128 bits and extracts the subkeys used
in the AES according to the number of rounds. The subkey is XORed to 16 bytes matrix
also known as AddRoundKey. The picture below illustrates an operation included in one
round [29].
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Figure 6.5: Diagram of one round AES encryption [29]
6.3 Modes of Operation
An encryption of data consisting of an arbitrary number of bits will be explained. The
AES encryption of blocks is used to protect keys. Chaining is the process to encrypt
data with the AES algorithm and thus confidentiality is provided. It results in the use of
different modes of operation in the meaning of blocks chaining to form encrypted data.
Above that, it is also notable to know if the sender was really the person who shares
the key for communication. Hence, authentication is implemented in some modes of
operation like CCM (Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
Mode) or GCM (Galois/Counter Mode). Moreover, authentication also detects whether
a message was altered during transmission or not. Every mode requires the exact length
of a multiple block size. It puts together the whole plaintext. Nevertheless, the plaintext
can have an arbitrary size. Due to this fact, plaintext has to be padded to fulfil the
blocks. A possible method is appending “1” bit to the plaintext and the append “0”
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to the desired size (reach a multiple of the block length). If the plaintext is an exact
multiple of the block length, an extra block consisting only of padding bits is appended.
The following described modes are used in the practical part. However, the AES can
operate in other modes as well.
6.3.1 Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC)
The Cipher-Block Chaining method (CBC) is based on the idea of chaining encrypted
blocks. It means that every block depends on the previous encrypted block. The first
block is randomized with an initialization vector IV which is an unique random number
of 16 bytes. The initialization vector is not secret and it is delivered together with the
encrypted data. Consequently, the IV is used as a nonce – a number used only once.
As seen in the following formula, every encrypted block is XORed with following block
consisting of a plaintext. Then the AES encryption is made with usually 16 bytes long
secret key. This method is suitable for reliable transfer medium using optics or metallics.
Block chaining is an appropriate solution with regard to security reasons. On the other
hand, if an error bit occurs, the decrypted message will contain n/2 more bit errors on
average.
Definition 6.3. Let e() be a block cipher of block size b; let xi and yi be bit strings of
length b; and IV be a nonce of length b.
. Encryption: yi = ek(xi ⊕ yi−1), i ≥ 2, yo = IV. Decryption: xi = e−1k (yi)⊕ yi−1, i ≥ 2, yo = IV
Figure 6.6: Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption [32]
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6.3.2 Counter Mode (CTR)
The Counter Mode is not a typical block cipher, because it uses a block cipher as a
stream cipher. In other words, the block cipher is computed first. Its inputs are a counter
- a number of n bits incrementing in every step and a key. The block cipher encryption
(AES) is realized with these inputs. Afterwards, the created block cipher is XORed with
an exact size of a plaintext with the result of a ciphertext. The input to the block cipher
has to be chosen very carefully and cannot be reproduced. In order to achieve this, an
example will be showed. A block cipher has an input width of 128 bits (the shorten
block of an AES). Firstly, 96 bits length IV is chosen as a nonce. The remaining 32 bits
are then used by a counter. For every block which is encrypted during the session, the
IV is still the same. Nevertheless, 32 bits length counter is incremented. This solution
gives 232 blocks to encrypt with one IV . If every block consists of 8 bytes, a maximum
of 23 ∗ 232 = 235 bytes – approximately 32 Gigabytes can be encrypted before a new IV
is generated [31].
Definition 6.4. Let e() be a block cipher of block size b, and let xi and yi be a bit strings
of length b. The concatenation of the initialization value IV and the counter CTRi is
denoted by (IV ||CTRi) and is a bit string of length b.
. Encryption: yi = ek(IV ‖ CTRi)⊕ xi, i ≥ 1
. Decryption: xi = ek(IV ‖ CTRi)⊕ yi, i ≥ 1
Figure 6.7: Counter (CTR) mode encryption [32]
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6.3.3 Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication
Code (CCM) Mode
An algorithm is based on the Counter mode (CTR) and the Cipher Block Chaining
Authentication Code (CBC-MAC). It is a generic mode providing an authentication
and a confidentiality. The two CCM processes are called generation-encryption and
decryption-verification. For both CTR and CBC-MAC is used the same key K within
the CCM [33]. The first step is to compute the authentication field using the CBC-
MAC. The CBC-MAC is applied to the whole plaintext with the secret key and zero
initialization vector. The result is the last block of the Cipher Block Chaining which
is considered as a Message Authentication Checksum (MAC) sometimes also called a
Message Integrity Check (MIC) or a Tag. It provides authenticity of data and ensures
that data have not been modified in transit. Moreover, it means that an integrity of data
is accomplished as well. The input data for the CTR Mode are 7 – 13 bytes nonce, 16
bytes key K, a plaintext and the MAC. The Counter mode is applied to the formatted
plaintext and the MAC separately. The resulting data – the ciphertext is the output of
the generation-encryption process [34].
The input into a decryption - verification process is a ciphertext and additionally
added data, that are not encrypted but authenticated (usually header). The CTR mode
is applied to the ciphertext to produce a corresponding MAC – “expected tag” and the
payload. If the nonce, the associated data string and the payload are valid, the strings
are formatted into appropriate blocks and the CBC-MAC is applied to verify the MAC.
If the MAC - “calculated tag” is identical as received, then the decryption - verification
process is successful. Otherwise, the payload and the MAC should not be revealed [32].
Figure 6.8: CCM mode encryption [32]
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6.4 Random Numbers Generators
Random number generators are necessary to construct key streams used in stream
ciphers. It is differentiated between three types of the random number generators which
will be described in more detail.
6.4.1 True Random Number Generators (TRNG)
These types of random number generators are also called “Non-deterministic Random
Bit Generators”. Their characteristic is based on an unpredictable output that cannot be
reproduced. The TRNGs depend on physical processes and the final output is modified
to be statistically independent. The Intel Pentium III uses for the TRNGs a temperature
noise of resistors [35]. Other examples like a semiconductor noise, a clock jitter in digital
circuits and a radioactive decay are also used for the generators.
6.4.2 Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNG)
Pseudorandom Number generators are considered as a deterministic approach to con-
struct a pseudorandom sequence of bits. Generating of a bits sequence is computed from
an initial seed value.
s0 = seed
si+1 = f(si), i = 0, 1, ...
A popular example is the linear congruential generator:
s0 = seed
si+1 = a si + b modm, i = 0, 1, ...
Integers a, b, m are constants. It should be noted that the PRNGs generators are not
truly randomized because they could be computed. Widely used rand() function is a
part of the ANSI C with parameters:
s0 = 12345
si+1 = 1103515245 si + 12345mod 231, i = 0, 1, ...
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Favorable statistical properties should maintain the PRNGs. Many mathematical
tests on the PRNGs can be conducted. The tests can verify the statistical behaviour
of sequences. However, using the asynchronous PRNGs is more secure, regarding their
robustness comparing linear systems. An example includes a A5/1 cipher used to encrypt
voice calls on telecommunication networks.
6.4.3 Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number Generators
(CSPRNG)
It is a special type of the PRNG used for cryptographic purposes. The general purpose
is that the output is unpredictable. It means that the output n of the keystream
si, si+1, . . . , si+n−1 is computationally infeasible to compute the subsequent of bits
si+n, si+n+1, ... According to Knuth [36], there are two requirements for cryptographically
strong PRNGs:
. There should be no obvious mathematical relationship between numbers in the
sequence, like common multiples, ordering of values, or patterns of values.. Any given key may be generated as part of variety of different key sequences.
The second statement describes a problem with the PRNGs, because they tend to
produce the same sequences repeatedly. An importance of the unpredictability of the
CSPRNGs is the general issue for the cryptography.
6.5 Hash Function
A hash function can be considered as a fingerprint of a message. For a particular
message, a hash digest or a hash value is calculated. An output is a unique fixed-length-bit
string of length n (usually 128-512 bits) representing the input message. The essential
parts of the hash function are digital signatures. They are also widely used to store
passwords or keys as in the case of this thesis. However, there is no need to use keys as
in symmetric algorithms. The Hash function is a one-way function z = h(x) and a given
hash output must be computationally infeasible to compute the input message x. The
advantage of the one-way function is that if the attacker obtains the hash function z,
then a regeneration h(−1)(z) = x of a message is not possible. To achieve this, security
requirements for hash functions are necessary. Three central properties need to be
possessed in order to be secure:
36
....................................... 6.5. Hash Function
. preimage resistance or one-wayness. second preimage resistance or weak collision resistance. collision detection or strong collision resistance
The preimage resistance is discussed above. The most crucial part to accomplish
one-wayness is the key derivation. Theoretically, there are possibilities to find correct
hash. A weak collision detection and a strong collision detection assure that for two
messages, the same hash value is not calculated . The weak collision detection tries to
find x2 with the same hash value as x1. On the other hand, the strong collision detection
referees to free choice of both messages x1 and x2. The collision detection is the most
critical security requirement.
Figure 6.9: Three security properties of hash functions [31]
6.5.1 Secure Hash Algorithm 256 (SHA-256)
SHA-256 is a frequently used message digest function. The SHA is a family of
cryptographic hash functions including four versions: SHA-0, SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3 [37].
It is supposed to be highly non-linear. In this chapter, attention is given to the SHA-256
which is used in the practical part later. The SHA is based on the Merkle–Damgård
construction and it is quite similar to a block cipher. It can be used for a message M of
length l bits, where 0 ≤ l ≤ 264. First is the message M padded with a binary ‘1’ followed
by a sufficient number of zeros and an additional block of 64-bits containing the binary
length of the original message. The maximum length of a message is 264. The length of a
padding is situated to create the blocks multiple of 512 bits. After the message has been
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padded, it must be cut to N blocks of 512 bits illustrated as M (1),M (2), ...,M (N). Every
block can be then expressed as sixteen 32-bit words, the first 32 bits of messages of block i
are denotedM (i)0 , the next 32 bits areM
(i)
1 up to the fifteenth block. From these sub blocks
an expansion of the block is conducted [38]. Together sixty-four 32-bit words are created.
A round on these words is constituted and the results are words W0,W1, . . . ,W63 as a
compression function. Consequently, Eight 32-bit words are created H(i)0 , H
(i)
1 , ...,H
(i)
7 .
They are used as an initialization hash value that are necessary to compute the final
message digest through eight hash values H(i) = H(i−1) + CM i (H(i−1)) to receive the
final hash value consisting of H(N)0 ‖ H(N)1 ‖ H(N)2 ‖ H(N)3 ‖ H(N)4 ‖ H(N)5 ‖ H(N)6 ‖ H(N)7 .
Where C is the SHA-256 compression function and + means word-wise mod 232 addition
and an input message M .
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Monitoring Network Activity
Analysis tools for monitoring network traffic are useful for detecting abnormalities.
A prevention against a malicious activity is the basis for securing systems. The key
benefit is an improvement of a security incident detection with a quick response time.
To strengthen and to expand the security, the Security Operations Centers (SOC) taking
care of monitoring can be seen in companies [39].
7.1 Intrusion Prevention/Detection (IPS/IDS) System
The Intrusion Prevention/Detection System (IPS/IDS) is a software application moni-
toring a network traffic of a device in both directions [40]. It protects devices against the
malicious activity or violation of signatures known as rules. The rules can be created
and edited by a user. However, in most cases the existing rules sets are used like the
Emergency Threats founded on the database of Proofpoint [41]. Therefore, the rules
based on the complex patterns identify the malicious activity. The network traffic is
logged into a specific logging file. Not to be confused about an output, a logging file
formatted in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is simple to be displayed with graphic
tools like Logstash. The system can be usually used in the IPS or the IDS mode. However,
there is a difference between them. The IDS system detects only a network traffic on a
specific interface and it alerts the user. On the other hand, the IPS system is able to
manipulate with packets, e.g. dropping them.
7.2 Suricata
The Suricata is a high-performance network security monitoring engine offering IPS
and IDS modes of operation. It is an open source owned by a non-profit foundation –
the Open Information Security Foundation (OISF). The most important part is creating
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and understanding of rules. A rule consists of the action, header and rule-options.
An action signature determines an activity of signatures’ matches. There are four
types of the Action.
. Pass. Drop. Reject. Alert
The signature with a pass action is an alarm for Suricata which will stop scanning the
packet and skip to the end of all rules for current packet. A drop action is only concerned
in a IPS/inline mode. If the Suricata matches the signature with the drop action, the
packet is not sent any further. In addition, a receiver does not receive a status message
reporting an error. To reject a packet a reject action is used. In compare with the drop
action, a receiver and a sender receive the packet. If offending packet concerns TCP
a reset packet will be sent. The rest of the used packets will result in the ICMP-error
packet. Lastly, an alert action does not threaten any packets. However, if signatures
match, the alert will be generated by the Suricata and it will be recorded in a logging file
as a possible danger. Due to different priorities of signatures, processing of rules should
not be in order in which they appear in a file. The most significant signature is scanned
first. The order is following: pass, drop, reject, alert.
A header signature contains a protocol, destination and source IP addresses and
ports. The protocol is used by the Suricata to determine which protocols need to be
concerned. It is possible to use options tcp, udp, icmp and ip. The ip option stands for
‘any’ and every protocol match this signature. In newly released version of the Suricata,
it is also possible to determine few added protocols like http, ftp, tls, smb and dns. Source
and destination of IP addresses can be combined in more modification as shown in the
example below. Instead of adding IP address directly to rules, it is possible to declare
them in a configuration file suricata.yaml.
!1.1.1.1 (Every IP address but 1.1.1.1)
![1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2] (Every IP address but 1.1.1.1 and 1.1.1.2)
$HOME_NET (Your setting of HOME_NET in yaml)
[$EXTERNAL_NET, !$HOME_NET] (EXTERNAL_NET and not HOME_NET)
[10.0.0.0/24, !10.0.0.5] (10.0.0.0/24 except for 10.0.0.5)
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Source and destination ports have similar requisites as IP addresses. According to the
type of traffic and received packets, different ports are used. The HTTP port uses port
80 or the encrypted version of HTTP uses port 443. If port is set to ‘any’, the rules are
fully influenced by the protocol. Allowing control in both direction gives the Suricata
feasibility to restrict outgoing packets. The example shows how the direction works.
source -> destination
source <> destination (both directions)
A rule option has additional settings for meta-information, headers, payloads and
flows. However, most of the network traffic is encrypted and some settings can be used
only on unencrypted packets. If an investigation of packet has to be deeper, then using
rule options instead of only header signatures is appropriate. One of the examples is
investigation of payload.
Figure 7.1: An example of a signature [41]
7.2.1 IPS/ Inline Mode
First, to use an Inline Mode, the Suricata has to be properly compiled and cooperation
with iptables and NFQUEUE (Netfilter Queue) has to be accomplished. The iptables is
a utility program for configuration tables provided by Linux kernel firewall. On most
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Linux distributions iptables are fundamental tools. They specify how will be the packets
in a system threatened [42]. The syntax of iptables is following:
iptables <option> <chain> <matching criteria> <target>
sudo iptables -I FORWARD -j NFQUEUE
NFQUEUE is a target of iptables which delegates the decision on packets to a userspace
software - Suricata. There are three modes using the NFQUEUE - accept, repeat and
route. If the mode is set to accept, the packets are not inspected by iptables anymore.
The mode route sends the packet to another tool after being processed. In the mode
repeat, packets are marked by the Suricata and they are re-injected at the first rule of
iptables [43].
Afterwards, it is important to determine how the device operates. In other words, a
device can behave like a gateway or like a client. If the Suricata runs as the gateway –
devices in an inner network have to be secured. Scenario 1 illustrates this situation as
forward_ing. To correctly apply the iptables, the following command is executed.
sudo iptables -I FORWARD -j NFQUEUE
In the case of the client situation illustrated in scenario 2, two iptables rules are created.
sudo iptables -I INPUT -j NFQUEUE
sudo iptables -I OUTPUT -j NFQUEUE
Figure 7.2: Suricata running on a gateway [43]
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Figure 7.3: Suricata running on a client [43]
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Part II
Practical Part
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Chapter 8
Design of Firmware Management
An implementation of a secure firmware upgrade can be achieved using different
approaches. The most spread procedure is likely a use of the crypto bootloader, because
it is an efficient solution to secure embedded devices. Nevertheless, vulnerabilities of
the bootloader implementation have already been discovered. Using a different method
which is more computationally demanding is also possible. The implementation should
be accessible and efficient to be widely spread. The proposed design is focused on an
upper layer secure implementation of an operating system-based firmware. The operating
system-based firmware is a part of the extensive amount of advanced embedded platforms
which are responsible for more computationally demanding applications. The Vocore2
represents this type of devices, hence for the testing is used.
A design of an upgrade process bears in mind today security threats and need for
increasing a prevention against the attacks. The approach is designed to not just secure
the process of the upgrade but also to monitor an incoming traffic. The network traffic is
analyzed and it is a crucial prevention of potential attacks. The prevention is performed
with the IPS system Suricata running in an Inline Mode. The whole process will consist of
an auto-run script written in the Python and the IPS system Suricata. These two elements
will cooperate and defend the device with help of a hardware USB key. The hardware
USB key will be a necessary part of an upgrade because using hardware security is much
stronger than using a software-defined security element. For the firmware management,
three basic features of cryptography have to be provided: confidentiality, integrity and
authenticity also known as CIA. Two approaches using different modes of operation of
AES are proposed to transfer the firmware securely. However, monitoring of the network
traffic and a management of a decrypted firmware is the same for both approaches.
The firmware used in the practical part is the OpenWrt. Next chapters are focused
on a compilation of an adjusted distribution of the OpenWrt, the testing of an upgrade
procedure, the program explanation and a measurement on an embedded device Vocore2.
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Chapter 9
Compilation of the OpenWrt
The OpenWrt project is a Linux distribution targeting embedded devices. It is an open
source firmware allowing to compile own distribution with the specific customization
through package management. The main targets generally cover OpenWrt routers,
however, it can be also ported to the client side device. The main advantage is an
availability of numerous packages covering programming languages like Python used
for scripting, network packages like Suricata or other storage packages. In May 2016,
the OpenWrt project was forked and the Linux Embedded Development Environment
(LEDE) was released. Nevertheless, in 2018 LEDE and OpenWrt joined under the name
of OpenWrt. The current stable version of OpenWrt is 17.01 which is a copy of the newest
LEDE firmware. OpenWrt 18.01 is in the development, nevertheless, distribution for
Vocore2 is stable and it contains numerous packages in comparison to the older version.
Therefore, OpenWrt 18.01 is used [44].
9.1 Build System
A source code of a firmware can be found at the website of GitHub in the official
OpenWrt repository. It is a frequently upgraded repository and the newest one containing
OpenWrt 18.01 will be used for a compilation. After cloning the repository to a com-
puter in home/Documents/openwrt directory, updating of packages have to take place.
Executing following commands, OpenWrt will be cloned to a directory and all available
packages will be updated and installed. It is important to use the newest version because
solely the latest releases contain plentiful content of packages.
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git clone https://www.github.com/openwrt/openwrt.git
./scripts/feeds update -a
./scripts/feeds install -a
9.1.1 Suricata Modules
Suricata packages are still not under the official distribution of OpenWrt. Only a
similar system Snort in IDS mode is available. However, a light version of the Suricata for
the OpenWrt could be found as an open source at GitHub from the Sean Lin developer
[45]. The Package is based on Suricata 4.0.4 and supports desired inline IPS mode.
Building Suricata is more difficult compared to official packages. Firstly, it is required
to separately copy downloaded package into /openwrt/package/feeds directory of cloned
OpenWrt. Next, running the Suricata needs to use iptables with NFQUEUE which is
not compiled by default. Hence, kernel modules and libraries for using iptables and
NFQUEUE have to be added. To find the Suricata in the OpenWrt configuration it is
necessary to update copied files and then open a configuration.
./scripts/feeds update -i suricata
./scripts/feeds install suricata
make menuconfig
Dependencies for Suricata like libyaml, libmagic, libpcap, libpcre, jansson, libnetfilter-
queue, libnfnetlink, libpthread, zlib have to be imported through configuration in /Libraries.
For iptables and NFQUEUE support, it is essential to import Kernel Modules kmod-
nfnetlink-queue, kmod-nfnetlink, kmod-ipt-nfqueue in /Netfilter/Extensions. Moreover, in
Network/iptables a package iptables-mod-nfqueue is imported and in /Libraries, libmnl,
libnfnetlink have to be added.
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Dependencies are prepared, however, these settings cause troubles with Suricata while
testing on a Vocore2. Suricata Makefile has to be adjusted and a library libmagic has
to be removed because it is an apparent reason for troubles. The mentioned library is
officially specified on a Suricata website as a necessary dependency. On the other hand,
on some architectures of embedded devices it showed up that libmagic is problematic and
running Suricata is suddenly aborted. The most probable reason is used MIPS processor.
Figure 9.1: Suricata Makefile
9.1.2 Python modules
A script written in the Python language is used to control the whole process of the
secure firmware upgrade with the help of Python modules. PyCryptodome module
includes plentiful AES modes such as required AES-CCM mode responsible for the
authentication and the encryption or the decryption procedure. A hash function used
for storing keys and data integrity is also available. The Python version 3.6.5 is added
in an official repository. However, PyCryptodome module is not available in the official
repository of the OpenWrt. Only an older version of PyCrypto module is available.
The PyCrypto module does not include AES-CCM mode which is required. On the
other hand, the structure of the PyCryptodome and the PyCrypto is almost identical.
After updating all feeds, a Makefile used for compilation of PyCrypto can be founded
in /Documents/openwrt/feeds/packages/lang/python/python-crypto. To replace the Py-
Crypto module with the PyCryptodome module, Makefile needs to be modified. A
package version is changed to 3.6.1. The most important part is to modify the correct
path to the PyCryptodome 3.6.1 module. The module is downloaded and the path to
the online repository is replaced with the PyCryptodome module which can be found in
a computer. The following figure shows the modified Makefile.
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Figure 9.2: PyCryptodome Makefile
9.1.3 External Memory
The Suricata and the Python modules are larger that the size of a Vocore2’s memory.
The main issue is the size of PyCryptodome module. Using the older PyCrypto module,
the Vocore2’s memory would be sufficient. In this procedure, an external memory is
necessary to add the desired module. During the compilation, packages supporting
USB device has to be added. The Kernel modules and packages supporting file system
ext4 are block-mount, kmod-fs-ext4 and /kmod-usb-storage located in /Base System and
Kernel/Modules. The advantage of an external memory is enough space for logs that
Suricata produces.
9.2 Compilation
Packages for the adjusted distribution are currently prepared. Next step is selecting
architecture, the target device and essential packages. While configuring Suricata, check
of an option ‘Compile with full language support’ guarantee that Suricata will be built
properly, otherwise compilation would be unsuccessful. It is also necessary to append
dependencies and packages like Python, Suricata or Nmap used for a port access check.
The complete configuration can be seen in the attachment. Having prepared everything,
configuration is saved and compilation can begins with the following command to see
error messages if they occur.
make -j V=s
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After a successful compilation, a binary file is created and it can be found in open-
wrt/bin/targets/ramips/mt76x8 location. The binary file – created firmware with the
adjusted distribution of OpenWrt openwrt-ramips-mt76x8-vocore2-squashfs-sysupgrade.bin
is prepared for the use. Only a sysupgrade firmware can be used for an upgrade through
a shell environment of the embedded device. It ought to be mentioned that the compiled
firmware cannot be bigger than a flash memory of the target device which is 16 MB in
Vocore2. Otherwise, the sysupgrade firmware would not be created.
Figure 9.3: Configuration of OpenWrt
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Chapter 10
Testing of Secure Firmware Upgrade
The procedure of the secure upgrade consists of an auto-run script which is present
on the Vocore2 and a terminal program on a computer which manage the process. All
programming is written in Python. The script on the Vocore2 cooperates with the
Suricata and it can modify Suricata rules. At the beginning of the process, the rules
are set to drop every attempt to get a remote access of a Vocore2. Going through the
successful authentication and sending the firmware for the upgrade, the rules can be
modified. The modification allows the remote access for the corresponding IP address of
an authenticated terminal. Then the management of the firmware is possible and the
upgrade of the firmware can be performed.
10.1 OpenWrt Configuration
Before the procedure of a remote upgrade of the firmware, the OpenWrt system needs to
be configured to be remotely accessible and have enough storage space. The connection to
the network has to be established. The Vocore2 is a memory limited device. Consequently,
the memory of a device is increased by adding USB drive and mounting it as an /overlay.
Finally, before the system can be used for the procedure, the vulnerable ports on the
Vocore2 are scanned to show the services which are opened to the network.
10.1.1 Network Settings
The Vocore2 can be run in two modes, an access point (AP) or a workstation (STA).
The AP mode is applied, if the Vocore2 is set up as a hotspot. In this case, the device is
connected to the gateway. Through connection to the Vocore2, it is possible to reach the
Internet. In the AP mode, the Vocore2 routes the traffic into the gateway which forward
packets further to the destination IP address.
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On the other hand, the STA mode works as a client. In this mode, the Vocore2 operates
as an end device which can communicate through the network. The STA mode is used
in this procedure. The configuration can be set for a wireless connection or the Ethernet
connection. Having connection more reliable, settings for the Ethernet connection is set
with the following commands. The IP address is added as the static 192.168.2.110. Then
the IP address of a gateway is set with a DNS server responsible for assigning domain
names with the corresponding IP addresses.
uci set network.lan.ipaddr=192.168.2.110
uci set network.lan.gateway=192.168.2.1
uci set network.lan.dns=8.8.8.8
uci commit
service network restart
Another settings involve dependencies for running Suricata in IPS inline mode. Hence,
iptables have to be configured. Consequently, a network traffic in both directions will
pass the Suricata. Iptables are useful security tools, in the case of aborting Suricata
intentionally. The device will be disconnected from the network because all the traffic is
set to go through the Suricata which is not running.
iptables -I INPUT -j NFQUEUE
iptables -I OUTPUT -j NFQUEUE
10.1.2 Storage Management
The main reason for using an external memory mounted as /overlay is a size of a
Python PyCryptodome library. The non-volatile memory of Vocore2 is 16 MB. However,
a size of a compiled version of the PyCryptodome is 7 MB and together with other
packages, the memory of the Vocore2 is exceeded.
A flash memory of Vocore2 is separated into layers consisting of partitions. Layer 0
is a flashchip which is connected to the SoC via SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface Bus).
Layer 1 consists of a bootloader U-boot which loads the firmware. Factory settings, the
OpenWrt firmware and U-boot environment variables cover Layer 1 as well. On Layer 2,
the firmware is separated into the kernel and the rootfs. During the booting procedure, a
kernel is copied to the temporary RAM and the booting procedure is executed. The rootfs
is a root (the user with the highest privilege) file system which consists of configuration
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files and applications which are necessary to run operating system. Layer 3 divides the
file system into the SquashFS file system as /rom and the JFFS2 filesystem as /overlay.
SquashFS is only readable and it is used in the safe mode. The next, JFFS2 is a writable
part of the file system containing every file in a memory written after an installation of
the system e.g. configuration files and an additional packages [11].
The following commands increase the size of the rootfs filesystem in the size of an
additional USB drive [46]. Firstly, the driver has to be formatted to ext4 file system.
Then file system table is enabled and partition of the USB driver is mounted to /overlay.
At the end of the process, files from existing flash memory in /overlay are copied into
the newly created /overlay in the external storage.
/etc/init.d/fstab enable
block detect > /etc/config/fstab
vi /etc/config/fstab
option target ’/overlay’
option enabled ’1’
mount –bind / /tmp/extroot
mkdir /tmp/system
mount /dev/sda1 /tmp/system
tar -C /tmp/extroot -cvf - . | tar -C /tmp/system -xf -
The Vocore2 needs to be rebooted, then an external memory appears. The external
memory is also important to store captured Suricata and system logs persisting in a
device memory. Suricata logs are stored in JSON file format which can be used for the
visual output.
Figure 10.1: Memory partition on Vocore2
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10.1.3 Port Scanning
Lastly, it is necessary to ensure that vulnerable ports on the embedded device are
disabled and a password to a get remote access to the device is set. The setting of a
password is accomplished by command passwd. The analysis of ports can be provided
with Nmap tool which can scan device and show all open ports on a device. It can be
seen that only port 22 (SSH) and 53 (DNS) are opened on Vocore2. DNS serves to a
domain name translation. To properly resolve the domain name with the corresponding
IP address, DNS needs to be opened.
Figure 10.2: Nmap tool used on a localhost
Only port 22 (SSH) is used for a management and it should be opened if exact
conditions are accomplished. Through the SSH can be managed the device and a firmware
is upgraded.
10.2 Suricata Settings
The procedure of firmware upgrade begins with the modification of Suricata rules.
The auto-run script on the Vocore2 adjusts the Suricata rules to drop all commu-
nication targeting a SSH port without an authentication. Consequently, Suricata
rules in etc/suricata/rules/test.rules location are created with the following command:
drop ip any any -> any 22. The command ensures that every attempt to get the access
SSH without authentication will be dropped and logged into a specific file found in
/var/log/suricata.
10.3 AES-CCM and CBC Mode Approach
When the default rules of the Suricata are set, an implementation of separate authen-
tication and encryption is conducted. The AES-CBC mode is used for an encryption
however, only confidentiality and integrity is provided. Authenticity has to be achieved
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as well. Digital signatures are not suitable due to demanding asymmetric encryption
and need for third-party Certification Authority (CA) which is a paid service. On the
other hand, it is satisfying solution avoiding Man in the Middle Attack (MITM). Instead
of using digital signatures, AES-CCM mode of operation resistant to MITM attack is
used to provide authenticity. Two different keys are necessary for authentication and
encryption. The keys are safely stored and protected against reading in a flash memory
of the device. The size of the keys can be various according to the used AES-128 or
AES-256 mode. In the implementation, 32 bytes long key created with the SHA-256 is
used.
Given that, hardware security is stronger than software security, a USB hardware key
is used. Due to this implementation, only an owner of a hardware key is able to upgrade
the device with an encrypted firmware from the manufacturer. Hardware key contains
safely stored a Pseudo Random Number (PRN). Size of the PRN is chosen for 512 bits.
The PRN is used as a seed for an initialization vector (IV) used for the CBC mode and
for nonce used in the CCM mode. The IV and the nonce are unique for every session
and must not be repeated again. From the PRN, the IV is declared by randomly selected
bits in length of 128 bits (16 bytes). Using the CCM mode, nonce selects 104 bits (13
bytes) from PRN [47].
10.3.1 Authentication
An authentication is provided in the AES-CCM mode with an authentication key and
a nonce as its inputs. Positions of selected bits from the PRN while creating the nonce
are stored as a Selected Numbers Order (SNO). A terminal performs a calculation of a
Message Authentication Checksum (MAC) and encrypts the MAC with AES-CTR mode
which is a part of AES-CCM mode. Together the MAC and the SNO are sent to the
device.
Device receives the MAC and the SNO. A valid authentication is only if a received MAC
is equal to a calculated MAC in a device. The device knows the secret authentication
key, only element which is unknown for decryption an calculation MAC is the nonce. Via
the PRN, a calculation of a correct nonce is possible because of the received SNO, which
stores positions of selected bits for the nonce. To accomplish that, a hardware USB key
storing the PRN has to be connected to device. A calculation of the MAC on the device
is currently possible. Finally, the device send an authentication packet to a terminal
with a valid access to send the firmware.
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10.3.2 Encryption and Decryption
An encryption of a new firmware (NFI) is performed with the AES-CBC mode with
inputs of a secret key and created IV. The key is a different key than used during
authentication. The same mechanism for creating SNO and IV is used. However, size
of IV is 16 bytes. The encrypted firmware is separated into frames of 1024 bytes and
send together via TCP packets to the device to provide assurance that data were not
lost during transmission. In previous authentication, UDP packets were used instead to
provide an authentication as quick as possible.
For a decryption, secure key and IV is mandatory. Generating of IV is the same
process as regenerating nonce during authentication. Due to PRN stored on a hardware
USB key and the SNO, there is enough information to regenerate IV. Consequently, the
encrypted firmware is stored in a temporary memory and a hash function SHA256 is
performed to check a data integrity. If the hash is valid with a hash received from a
terminal, the integrity is correct and the decryption of firmware can start. The final
decrypted firmware is prepared to be managed.
Figure 10.3: The procedure of encryption/decryption in AES-CBC mode
While testing the output of procedure on Vocore2 is reported into report.txt file which
can be found on the Vocore2. The following figure shows the procedure until the successful
decryption and allowing the remote access.
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Figure 10.4: The report of the procedure on Vocore2
10.4 AES-CCM Approach
There is another option which is an alternative to AES-CCM and CBC Mode Approach.
An adaptation of the AES-CCM mode for the whole procedure can replace separate
authentication and encryption. This adaptation is more demanding for computing
resources. However, the process of authentication, encryption and a data integrity
check is put together due to characteristics of the AES-CCM mode. The authentication
and the data integrity is provided with MAC which is constructed from the firmware.
Confidentiality is ensured with AES-CTR mode which is a part of AES-CCM mode.
During the process, only one key is necessary and it should be safely stored in the flash
memory of a device.
The same hardware security as in the previous method is used. PRN is 512 bits and
the nonce (13 bytes) is randomly selected from the PRN. An initialization vector (IV)
for AES CCM is usually declared as the zero value. Suricata settings and a management
of the device remain the same during the procedure.
10.4.1 Authentication and Encryption/Decryption
The AES-CCM mode needs as inputs a nonce, a key and the firmware. First, 13
bytes nonce is created and its positions from PRN are stored as SNO. Then the MAC
calculation is conducted. The MAC is the last block of the AES-CBC mode with inputs
of zero IV, the key and the firmware in the form of a plaintext. Finally, the AES-CTR
mode is conducted on the MAC and firmware separately. The encrypted data in the AES-
CCM mode consisted of the encrypted firmware and the encrypted MAC are prepared
for transfer. The SNO and the data are sent from terminal to the Vocore2 via TCP
connection to avoid the loss of packets.
The device receives SNO and encrypted data. It is also able to regenerate the nonce.
If a hardware USB key is available, SNO will pick the correct positions from PRN to
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regenerate the nonce. The same key as in the terminal is stored in the memory of a device.
Together nonce and the key are two necessary parts for decryption. Due to the known
size of MAC which is the size of the last block - 16 bytes, encrypted data could be divided
into an encrypted MAC and an encrypted new firmware (NFI). The authentication
and the integrity check of the firmware are performed in one step. Decrypted MAC is
considered as the “expected tag”. The rest of data belongs to the firmware. These data
are decrypted with AES-CTR and the output is used for AES-CBC encryption with the
result of the last block considered as the “calculated tag”. The expected tag and the
calculated tag are compared. If the tags are matched, the authentication is valid and
moreover, the data integrity of firmware is guaranteed, because the firmware acts as an
input for the MAC. Validation is correct and the decrypted firmware can be used for a
firmware upgrade by management of the firmware. To inform the terminal, the UDP
packet with validation for remote access is sent. Otherwise, the MACs are not matched,
the decrypted firmware is immediately deleted. Consequently, the terminal is informed
with unsuccessful attempt of an upgrade.
Figure 10.5: The procedure of firmware upgrade in AES-CCM mode
The output of the procedure is also reported into a report.txt file. However, the
structure is almost the same as in AES-CCM and CBC Mode Approach.
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10.5 Management of the Firmware
When a decryption is successful despite the approach which was used for the authentica-
tion and encryption, the device rewrites Suricata rules. These rules allow SSH connection
of an authenticated terminal. The rules in etc/suricata/rules/test.rules are changed to
the following form: drop ip any any -> !source_ip_address 22. Where source_ip_address
is a IP address of terminal. The entry instructs that every packet targeting port 22 will
be dropped except the IP address of the terminal. The following figure shows the output
of the terminal script which informs that the decryption of firmware was successful and
the remote access from the terminal to the device is now possible.
Figure 10.6: The output of terminal script for AES-CCM approach
The terminal can now be connected via SSH to the device and the process of upgrade
firmware can be finished. The decrypted firmware will be found in the temporary memory
/tmp. According to the OpenWrt there are two possibilities of upgrading firmware via
command line. The tool sysupgrade and the mtd_write tool.
ssh root@192.168.2.110
sysupgrade -v /tmp/[specified firmware].bin
mtd -r write /tmp/[specified firmware].bin firmware
After executing sysupgrade or the mtd_write tool, the configuration settings are saved
and the firmware is written to memory. At the end, the system is rebooted and firmware
is uncompressed. If the firmware is not damaged, the kernel initializes all components of
the new firmware and the OpenWrt is ready to use.
63
10. Testing of Secure Firmware Upgrade .............................
Figure 10.7: Successful uncompressing of the firmware
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Implementation details
An auto-run script is written in the Python version 3.6.5 which is supported by
OpenWrt. The two scripts for an implementation are required. The first script is written
for the terminal located on a computer. It encrypts and sends the firmware to the device.
The second script is running on Vocore2 and cooperates with Suricata to avoid unsolicited
actions on the network interface. It is necessary to import default Python modules to
establish a connection or to manipulate with files. Moreover, PyCryptodome module is
additionally added. This module contains Pseudo Random Number Generators, numerous
list of AES modes and most of the commonly used hash functions. The following chapter
gives the most significant examples of the program.
11.1 Creating variables
At the beginning, declaration of variables has to take part. The PRN is the initial vari-
able and it has to be randomly generated with the random function from PyCryptodome
module. The PRN is created as 512 long integer array consisted of ‘1’ and ‘0’. The array
is created to easily pick random bits while construction of IV or nonce.
PRN = [ ]
prn_bits =512
def generatePRN(prn_bits):
for i in range(0,prn_bits):
value = random.randint(0,1)
PRN.insert(i,value)
a = bytearray(PRN)
return a
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A constructed PRN is saved as binary data into a file. After that, it is stored in the
terminal and in the USB hardware key which is delivered to a device. Every upgrade
sessions, PRN is read as shown in the next example.
def Read_PRN_file():
with open(filename, ’rb’) as infile:
prn = infile.read(1024)
a = list(prn)
PRN serves as a seed for generating nonce in authentication and IV in encryption.
The Difference is only in the size of these variables – nonce is 13 bytes long and IV is 16
bytes long. As seen in the next example SNO and nonce of 13 bytes is created. Index
stands for the position of chosen bit from PRN.
nonce_bits = 104
sno =[ ]
nonce = [ ]
def generateSNOandNonce(nonce_bits):
for i in range(iv_bits):
index = random.randrange(len(PRN))
sno.insert(i,index)
pick = PRN[index]
nonce.insert(i,pick)
The last important step while creating variables is to set the appropriate form and the
right size of a variable. Using integers is simple for manipulation. However, for every
variable that will be transmitted, the correct length in the form of the binary data has to
be performed. The following example transforms integers into binary data with correct
size such as 16 bytes for IV.
string_iv = ”.join(str(e) for e in iv)
hexa_iv= ’%0*X’ % ((len(string_iv) + 3) // 4, int(string_iv, 2))
bytes_iv = bytes.fromhex(hexa_iv)
66
.................................... 11.2. Network connection
11.2 Network connection
A network communication is ensured by a socket module. The procedure uses two types
of protocols. The first UDP is used in an authentication and a confirmation of status on
Vocore2. The UDP is a connectionless protocol and it can be easily implemented. The
following example is a part of AES-CCM + CBC approach. It shows communication
between the terminal and the Vocore2, while Vocore2 successfully check MAC and send to
the terminal value ’x00’ in the payload. The value ’x00’ means for the terminal that the
authentication was validated and the procedure can continue with sending an encrypted
firmware.
terminal = 192.168.2.190
port =5005
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
sock.sendto(b’x00’, (terminal, port))
sock.close()
Terminal receives the UDP packet. According to the content, the authentication
message is considered as valid or invalid.
port = 5005
localhost = 192.168.2.190
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
sock.bind((localhost, port))
while True:
message, addr = sock.recvfrom(1024)
if message == b’x00’:
print("Authentication Valid......")
else:
print("Authentication is not valid :(")
break
sock.close()
On the other hand, TCP connection is considered as a reliable communication especially
used for the data transfer. The terminal operates as a server and the Vocore2 as a client.
The server needs to bind the IP address and the port to listen on it. Then the connection
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has to be established with the three-way handshake to be synchronized and ensure that
packets will not be lost during the transmission. The following example is a part of
AES-CCM approach and it shows how an encrypted firmware declared as data is sent to
Vocore2. Terminal listens on the binded port to connect one client. Then the encrypted
firmware is send with SendFile function to Vocore2. The AcceptMessage function informs
the terminal about the status of decryption on the Vocore. If the decryption is successful,
a specific message ’x00’ translated as ‘allow’ is sent from Vocore2 and the socket is closed.
port= 5010
terminal = 192.168.2.190
s = socket.socket()
s.bind((terminal,port))
s.listen(1)
while True:
c, addr = s.accept()
print("client connected ip:<", str(addr), ">")
t = threading.Thread(target=SendFile,args=("retrThread",c))
t.start()
if AcceptMessage() == "allow":
s.close()
break
Vocore2 receives data with an encrypted firmware and save them into a file.
port= 5010
terminal = 192.168.2.190
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((terminal, port))
data = s.recv(1024)
s.close
11.3 Cryptography
An application of cryptography is ensured with the PyCryptodome module. The
process of encryption and decryption is almost identical. The following example shows
function for encryption for the firmware with the AES-CBC mode.
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def encrypt(key, filename):
chunksize = 64*1024
outputFile = "encrypted"+filename
filesize = str(os.path.getsize(filename)).zfill(16)
encryptor = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, hex_array_iv_cbc)
with open(filename, ’rb’) as infile:
with open(outputFile, ’wb’) as outfile:
outfile.write(filesize.encode(’utf-8’))
outfile.write(hex_array_iv_cbc)
while True:
chunk = infile.read(chunksize)
if len(chunk) == 0:
break
elif len(chunk) % 16 !=0:
chunk += b’ ’ * (16 - (len(chunk) % 16))
outfile.write(encryptor.encrypt(chunk))
The process reads data from the firmware and encrypts them with the object encryptor
which needs to declare outputs as the key, the IV and the AES mode. The encrypted
data consists of the file size of an original firmware and the firmware itself. Together it
forms an encrypted firmware.
The Decryption process is inverse to the encryption. The object decryptor has to
be created and the encrypted file is read and then it is written into a new file consist
of original firmware. The file size which is written at the beginning of an encrypted
firmware serves to decrypt the correct size of the firmware.
11.4 Command Management
The script located on the Vocore2 needs to manage processes and execute commands
to cooperate with the Suricata and hardware USB key. The script has to be able to
run Suricata and rewrite rules to match signatures if the authentication and firmware
decryption is validated. Cooperation with the hardware USB key consists of mounting
the device to the system and reading the PRN from the hardware key. The following
example shows a creation of the default signatures and running the Suricata. The variable
of the subprocess is created for terminating the Suricata while the new rules are created.
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Otherwise, if the Suricata is not rebooted, the newly created signatures are not initialized.
with open(completename, ’w’) as outfile:
outfile.write(’drop ip any any -> any 22
(msg: "Default settings for upgrade testing";)’)
cmd = "suricata -c /etc/suricata/suricata.yaml -q0"
p = subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True)
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Measurement
Embedded systems tend to be low power devices. The Vocore2 can be considered as
an embedded device with more computing resources. The usage of computing resources
is measured to picture how demanding is the proposed method of a firmware upgrade.
The measurement is conducted on the Vocore2 and it consists of time for an upgrade,
CPU (Central Processing Unit) usage and VSZ (Virtual Memory Size) usage. The
measured approaches are AES-CCM mode and AES-CCM+CBC mode with separate
authentication and encryption. The compared result also shows the difference between
the used key size. The key is 128 bits length constructed with MD5 hash function or 256
bits length constructed with SHA-256 hash function.
Time for the upgrade is measured on the terminal in the Integrated Development
Environment (IDE) Pycharm. Import of the time module is required to see the time
output. The measured time covers the whole process to get the access to the device, where
the decrypted firmware is prepared for an upgrade. It does not include a management of
the firmware because the management is controlled by a user and it is independent on a
used mode of an operation. The following results show the average time from 10 values
measured for each method. The longest time of an upgrade using AES-256 CCM mode
takes 12.972 seconds. It can be seen that use of the smaller key size can slightly make
the upgrade quicker.
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Table 12.1: Firmware upgrade time
The CPU usage is measured on the Vocore2. The measurement is conducted until
the settings of a new access policy when the firmware is prepared to be managed. The
method of measurement consists of using top program which provides a real-time view of
a running system. The top program captures data and the output is redirected into the
measurement_ top.txt file in Vocore2. The capturing is executed every second and the
command is added to the Python auto-run script. At the end of the measurement, the
captured data have to be filtered to obtain only information about Suricata and Python
script. A grep is another tool that helps to accomplish that. The following example is
responsible for creating the top output containing CPU values used by Suricata
top -b -d 1 > measurement_top.txt
cat measurement_top.txt | grep Suricata
The VSZ usage shows how the tasks use the available memory. Virtual memory maps
memory addresses used by a task. The addresses can be targeted to the RAM or to a
flash memory of a Vocore2. The same process for the measurement as for the CPU usage
is used.
The first chart shows computing resources usage of the Suricata. The result of using
another AES modes is still with the same progress. It can be seen that running Suricata
is not CPU demanding. At the beginning of the task, the higher CPU usage can be
detected. During the upgrade process, the level of CPU usage is under 10 %. The decline
of CPU and VSZ is caused by creating new Suricata rules and re-running the Suricata.
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Table 12.2: Suricata AES-256 CCM+CBC
The more computing demanding is an auto-run script which does not affect the system
during an inactive run. However, during the firmware upgrade, there is a substantial
increase to the level of 90 % of CPU usage. The first peak of CPU usage shows an
authentication process which is performed in a more demanding CCM mode. Then the
decrease shows the time while the encrypted firmware is being transferred. The second
peak shows the decryption of the firmware in the CBC mode which consumes the same
amount of CPU. On the other hand, the time of CBC decryption is lower than the time
during authentication. At the end, the scripts behave like an inactive and the usage of
CPU is not notable. VSZ remains on almost the same level for the whole process.
The second example of an auto-run script shows AES-256 CCM mode. The inactive
mode is not correctly adjusted and it shows 30 % of CPU usage which should be lowered
in the real usage. The issue is a TCP connection which tries to establish a connection in
a loop between the terminal and the Vocore2. Nevertheless, the process of upgrade shows
different continuity than AES-CCM+CBC. The authentication and decryption are put
together and the chart clearly shows this fact. The slight increase shows decryption with
CTR mode to obtain MAC and firmware. The highest level of computing usage represents
calculating of MAC with CBC mode and a comparison of values. This procedure reaches
the maximum of 94 % of CPU usage. After the process, CPU usage decline to the level
of an inactive mode. The VSZ is the constant in this case at the level of 15 % of the
VSZ usage.
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Table 12.3: Python script AES-256 CCM+CBC
Table 12.4: Python script AES-256 CCM
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Conclusions
The research of the IoT security vulnerabilities showed that the most exposed devices
to unsolicited actions are mostly home devices. The end users are usually not concerned
about the security of their devices which are connected to the Internet. Manufacturers
should put more effort to accurately inform customers about the security vulnerabilities
of their systems. The performed attacks can affect the target diversely, nevertheless
the most critical threat is the firmware modification. If users were aware of using
the default password and using open ports, most of the attacks would be unsuccessful
and more complex attacks have to be devised up. On the other hand, the security
of firmware management of embedded devices used in an industrial area is commonly
resistant to the attacks. To avoid modification of the firmware, implementations of secure
firmware upgrade are discovered. The most applied implementations are bootloaders
which verify the firmware before the booting process. Nevertheless, an analysis of these
bootloaders also known as the crypto bootloaders was conducted and the weakness of
this implementation was discovered.
The vast amount of security elements on embedded devices tend to secure the device
with the strong cryptographic procedure. However, an embedded device has computing
power limitations and the security has to bear in mind the hardware used for the device.
To improve the security of the embedded device, the prevention against the attack can
be a solution. The devices are remotely controlled and they are exposed to the Internet.
The prevention consists of controlling network traffic going through the network interface
of the embedded device. For the prevention, IPS system Suricata is used. It controls the
network traffic with the signatures and it can be considered as the prevention mechanism
which can recognize a possible attack. In the practical part of the thesis, a secure firmware
upgrade procedure was proposed. The proposed design consists of the prevention system
which can cooperate with the cryptographic procedure formed with the hardware security.
Together it can ensure the highest level of security.
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Generally, the embedded devices can be very diverse. The hardware resources and the
type of operations are different. Some embedded devices collecting data do not need a
higher computing power, because the power consumption is the most crucial. Therefore,
an optimization and stability of the proposed secure upgrade have to be performed. The
measurement of firmware upgrade procedure was conducted on the embedded platform
Vocore2 to see how the process is demanding to power resources. The result showed
that the firmware upgrade process considered as an active mode is very demanding for
Vocore2’s processor with the frequency of 580 MHz. However, the computing performance
was sufficient. The inactive mode of the security elements consisted of Suricata and
auto-run script which run in the background showed the usage of the processor under
10 % and usage of virtual memory about 43 %. The hardware resources of Vocore2 were
satisfactory, only the higher usage of virtual memory during the inactive mode can be
the reason for higher power consumption. As a result, the proposed firmware procedure
can target the embedded devices with higher computing resources as gateways. The very
low power devices such as dataloggers would be probably not sufficient. Nevertheless,
these devices can be considered as an end devices. They should be hidden in the network
behind the gateway to not be directly exposed to the Internet. Then the less computing
demanding procedure of the upgrade firmware can be applied to them.
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Appendix A
DVD contents
The following table shows directories which are contained on the DVD.
Directory name Description
compiled_openwrt Compiled firmware
measurement Tables and charts of measured data
photo_documentation Photo documentation of Vocore2
scripts_terminal Python scripts which manage the procedure on a computer
scripts_vocore2 Python scripts which manage the procedure on Vocore2
thesis This bachelor thesis
Table A.1: DVD content
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